彼得森经济研究所-重组主权债务：需要一个协调的框架（英）.pdf

1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA|+1.202.328.9000|www.piie.comPOLICYBRIEFSeanHagan,nonresidentseniorfellowatthePetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics,isformergeneralcounselfortheInternationalMonetaryFund,professoratGeorgetownLawandSciencesPo,andadvisortoRothschild&Co.BradSetseristheWhitneyShepardsonSeniorFellowattheCouncilonForeignRelations.24-4RestructuringSovereignDebtTheNeedforaCoordinatedFrameworkSeanHaganandBradSetserMay2024Whenasovereign’sdebtisunsustainable,allstakeholders—thesovereign,itsofficialcreditors,andmostprivatecreditors—shareaninterestinarestructuringthatquicklyrestoressustainability.Notwithstandingthisgeneralalignmentofinterests,thecurrentrestructuringprocessissubjecttodelayandunpredictability.Concernsregardingintercreditorequityareakeyfactor,andtheseconcernshavebeenexacerbatedbythe“sequential”natureoftherestructuringprocess,whereofficialcreditorsaregenerallyexpectedtocommittodebtrelieftermsbeforeprivatecreditors.Tospeeduptherestructuringprocess,thisPolicyBriefproposesthattherestructuringofofficialclaimsandprivateclaimsproceedinaparallelyetcoordinatedmanner.Toaddressintercreditorequityconcerns,anewcontingencymechanismwouldbeavailabletoallowsimultaneousdecisionmaking:Beforeonecreditorgroupdecidestoacceptanoffer,thesecreditorswouldknowwhateveryoneelseisbeingoffered.Suchamechanismwouldnotbemandatory—theremaybecircumstanceswhereonegroupispreparedtomovebeforetheothers.Sucha“CoordinatedFramework”willrequiregreaterinformationsharing,consistentwiththetypesoftransparencyreformsthathavebeenadvancedbytheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF).INTRODUCTIONOneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofthesovereigndebtarchitectureisthatitisconstructedentirelyonthebasisofacceptednormsandpractices.Unlikecorporateorbankreorganization,thereisnopubliclawthatguidestheprocess.Andperhapsnotsurprisingly,theevolutionofthesenormsandpracticeshasbeenshapedbyevents,witheachsovereigndebtcrisisrevealingweaknessesthat,inturn,catalyzereform.Itisfairtosaythat,formanyyears,thecentralpreoccupationofpolicymakershasbeenreformdirectedattheresolutionofcollectiveactionproblemsamongprivatecreditors.Coordinationproblemsacrossprivatecreditorshadgrowninimportancewiththeshiftfrombankloanstobonds,thegrowingdiversityofcreditorinterests,andthesuccessofholdoutandlitigationstrategiesincountriessuchasPeruandArgentina.Itisalsofairtosaythatthereformsintroduced2 PB24-4|MAY2024todatehavebeenrelativelysuccessfulinreducingtheleverageofpotentiallydisruptiveprivatecreditors:whetheritbethroughastrengtheningofIMFpolicies,includingitspolicyoflendingintoarrears,orthroughtheintroductionofincreasinglyrobustcollectiveactionclausesinsovereignbondcontracts.1TheestablishmentoftheCommonFrameworkinlate2020wasarecognitionoftheemergenceofadifferenttypeofcollectiveactionproblem—oneinvolvingofficialbilateralcreditors.2Asinthecasewithprivatecreditors,theperceivedneedforreformwasdrivenbychangesincomposition:TheParisClubrestructuringprocesscouldnotcontinuetobetheanchorofcoordinationgiventhatmanyofthelarg