美联储-家庭对通货膨胀的偏好与货币政策权衡（英）.pdf
FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeriesFederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print)ISSN2767-3898(Online)Households"PreferencesOverInationandMonetaryPolicyTradeo sDamjanPfajfarandFabianWinkler2024-036Pleasecitethispaperas:Pfajfar,Damjan,andFabianWinkler(2024).Households"PreferencesOverIn-ationandMonetaryPolicyTradeo s,"FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSe-ries2024-036.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.036.NOTE:Sta workingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.Theanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchsta ortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.Households’PreferencesOverInflationandMonetaryPolicyTradeoffs∗DamjanPfajfar†FederalReserveBoardFabianWinkler‡FederalReserveBoardMay31,2024AbstractWedocumentnovelfactsaboutU.S.householdpreferencesoverinflationandmonetarypolicy.Manyhouseholdsarehighlyattentivetonewsaboutmonetarypolicyandtointerestrates.ThemedianhouseholdperceivestheFederalReserve’sinflationtargettobethreepercent,butwouldpreferittobelower.Quantifyingthetradeoffbetweeninflationandunemployment,wefindanaverageacceptablesacrificeratioof0.6,implyingthathouseholdsarelikelytofinddisinflationcostly.Averagepreferencesarewellrepresentedbyanon-linearlossfunctionwithnearequalweightsoninflationandunemployment.Thesepreferencesalsoexhibitsizabledemographicheterogeneity.Keywords:HouseholdSurvey,Attention,InflationTarget,SacrificeRatio,DualMandateJEL:D12,E52,E58†BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem.Address:20thandConstitutionAve.NW,Washington,DC20551,U.S.A.;email:‡BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem.Address:20thandConstitutionAve.NW,Washington,DC20551,U.S.A.;email:∗WethankBenjaminJohannsen,DavidL´opez-Salido,ChristopherGust,BobTetlow,MichaelWeber,CarolaBinder,FrancescoZanetti,DonKim,ConnorBrennan,andotherparticipantsattheMAReGroupandtheMSUbrownbag(FederalReserveBoard)fortheircommentsandsuggestions.WealsothankOlivierArmantierandothermembersoftheSurveyofConsumerExpectationsteamattheFederalReserveBankofNewYorkforincludingourquestionsintheirsurveyandtheirhelpwithdraftingthequestions.JoseNinoprovidedexcellentresearchassistance.TheviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemoritsstaff.11.IntroductionCongresshasmandatedtheFederalReservetopromotemaximumemployment,stableprices,andmoderatelong-terminterestrates.Thismandatedoesnotspecifyhowtoweightheseobjectiveswhentheyareinconflict.Italsoleavesopentheprecisedefinitionofeachobjective,includingtheinflationtarget.Onewaytoestablishsuchprescriptionsisthroughtheuseofmacroeconomicmod-els,especiallythosethatwerebuiltintheNew-Keynesiantradition.However,theresultingpolicyprescriptionsvarygreatlywiththeass
