彼得森经济研究所-美国货币政策与近期通胀飙升（英）.pdf

1750MassachusettsAvenue,NW|Washington,DC20036-1903USA|+1.202.328.9000|www.piie.comWORKINGPAPER24-13USMonetaryPolicyandtheRecentSurgeinInflationDavidReifschneiderMay2024ABSTRACTFederalReservepolicyinthewakeoftheCOVIDpandemichasbeenwidelycriticizedasrespondingtooslowlytosurginginflationandanoverheatedlabormarket,therebyexacerbatingtheinflationproblemandimpairingmacroeconomicperformancemoregenerally.Thispaperchallengesthisviewbyexploringthelikelyeffectsofamarkedlymorerestrictivecounterfactualmonetarypolicystartinginearly2021.Underthispolicy,theFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)wouldhavestrictlyfollowedtheprescriptionsofabenchmarkpolicyrulewithlaborutilizationgaugedusingtheratioofvacanciestounemployment,therebycausingthefederalfundsratetorisefasterandbymuchmorethanitactuallydid.Inaddition,consistentwiththealternativerule-basedstrategy,theFOMCwouldhaveprovidedlessaccommodativeforwardguidancethanwhatitimplicitlyprovidedovertime,basedonthepost-COVIDevolutionoftheeconomicprojectionsmadebyFOMCparticipantsandmajorfinancialinstitutions.Finally,theFedwouldhaveendeditslarge-scaleassetpurchasesearlierandbegunshrinkingitsbalancesheetsooner.Becauseofuncertaintyaboutinflationdynamics,simulationsoftheeffectsofthecounterfactualpolicyarerunusingdifferentspecificationsofthePhillipscurvedrawnfromrecentstudies,witheachinturnembeddedinalarge-scalemodeloftheUSeconomythatprovidesadetailedtreatmentofthemonetarytransmissionmechanism.Usingarangeofassumptionsforexpectationsformationandtheinterestsensitivityofaggregatespending,thevariousmodelsimulationssuggestthatamorerestrictivestrategyonthepartoftheFOMCwouldhavedonelittletocheckinflationin2021and2022,althoughitprobablywouldhavespeditsreturnto2percentthereafter.Becausethemodestreductionsininflationsuggestedbythesesimulationswouldhavecomeatacostofhigherunemploymentandlowerrealwages,thenetsocialbenefitofamorerestrictivepolicyresponseonthepartoftheFOMCseemsdoubtful;thepaperalsoquestionsthewisdomofamorerapidandpronouncedtighteningonrisk-managementgrounds.DavidReifschneider,nowretiredfromtheFederalReserveBoard,heldvariouspositionsinitsDivisionofResearchandStatisticsfrom1982to2013andwasspecialadvisortoChairJanetYellenfrom2014to2018.2 WP24-13|MAY2024JELCodes:E17,E37,E58Keywords:Inflation,monetarypolicyNote:ThisWorkingPaperispartofaseriestitledUnderstandingCOVIDEraInflation.PIIEgratefullyacknowledgesthefinancialsupportfromadonorwhowishestoremainanonymousfortheresearchpresentedinthisWorkingPaper.Theresearchwasconductedindependently.Fundersarenevergiventherighttofinalreviewofapublicationbeforeitsrelease.ThispaperhasgreatlybenefitedfromthecommentsofJoshBivens,KarenDynan,WilliamEnglish,JosephGagnon,MarkGertler,MichaelKiley,MatthewLuzzetti,PeterHooper,andDavidWilcox.Allerrorsandopinionsaretheauthor’sown.Page|11.IntroductionFederalReservemonetarypolicyhasbeenwidelycriticizedinrecentyears.Forexample,reactingtoguidancefromtheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC),theFed’spolicymakinggroup,thatthefederalfundsratewaslikelytoremainnearzeroforsometimeto