美联储-财经系列讨论（英）.pdf
FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeriesFederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print)ISSN2767-3898(Online)AreSupplyNetworksEcientlyResilient?AgostinoCapponi,ChuanDu,JosephE.Stiglitz2024-031Pleasecitethispaperas:Capponi,Agostino,ChuanDu,andJosephE.Stiglitz(2024).AreSupplyNetworksE-cientlyResilient?,"FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2024-031.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.031.NOTE:Sta workingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.Theanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchsta ortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.Aresupplynetworksefficientlyresilient?AgostinoCapponiChuanDuJosephE.Stiglitz*May16,2024AbstractWeshowthatsupplynetworksareinefficiently,andinsufficiently,re-silient.Upstreamfirmscanexpandtheirproductioncapacitytohedgeagainstsupplyanddemandshocks.Thesocialbenefitsofsuchinvestmentsarenotinternalized,however,becauseofmarketpowerandmarketincompleteness.Upstreamfirmsunderinvestincapacityandresilience,passingonthecoststodownstreamfirms,anddrivetradeexcessivelytowardthespotmarkets.Thereisawedgebetweenthemarketsolutionandaconstrainedoptimalbenchmark,whichpersistsevenwithoutrareandlargeshocks.Policiesdesignedtoin-centivizecapacityinvestment,reducerelianceonspotmarkets,andenhancecompetitionamelioratetheexternality.(JELD21,D24,D25,D43,D85,E23,L13)*Capponi:DepartmentofIndustrialEngineeringandOperationsResearch,ColumbiaUniversity,NewYork;email:ac3827@columbia.edu.Du:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,WashingtonD.C.;email:chuan.du@frb.gov.Stiglitz:ColumbiaBusinessSchool,ColumbiaUni-versity,NewYork;Email:jes322@columbia.edu.Theviewsinthispaperaresolelytheauthors’andshouldnotbeinterpretedasreflectingtheviewsoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemorofanyotherpersonassociatedwiththeFederalReserveSystem.AsignificantpartofthisworkwasundertakenwhileChuanDuwasemployedattheBankofEngland.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheBankofEnglandoranyofitscommittees.WethankourdiscussantsandconferenceparticipantsattheAlliedSocialScienceAssociationAnnualMeeting2023andtheInternationalEconomicAssociationWorldCongress2023,aswellasseminarparticipantsattheBankofEnglandandtheFederalReserveBoard,fortheirconstructivecommentsandsuggestions.1TheshortagesandspikesinpricesofcertainintermediategoodsduringtheCOVID-19pandemicdemonstratedthefragilityofsupplychains.Prominentex-amplesincludedaglobalshortageofsemiconductorsthatledtoadramaticriseinthepriceofsecondhandcarsintheU.S.andanunprecedenteddemandforhandsanitizerandpersonalprotectivegearthattriggeredsupplyshortagesintheirre-spective,aswellasinterlinked,industries.Policymakersreactedstronglybytakingindustry-specificactionstorepairlinkagesa
