美联储-货币政策、就业缺口与自然利率假说（英）.pdf
FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeriesFederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print)ISSN2767-3898(Online)MonetaryPolicy,EmploymentShortfalls,andtheNaturalRateHypothesisMichaelT.Kiley2024-032Pleasecitethispaperas:Kiley,MichaelT.(2024).MonetaryPolicy,EmploymentShortfalls,andtheNaturalRateHypothesis,"FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2024-032.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2024.032.NOTE:Sta workingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.Theanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchsta ortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.iMonetaryPolicy,EmploymentShortfalls,andtheNaturalRateHypothesisMichaelT.Kiley*May19,2024AbstractActivityshortfallsaremorecostlythanstrongactivity.Iconsideroptimalmonetarypolicyunderdiscretionwithanasymmetric(activityshortfalls)lossfunction.Themodelsatisfiesthenaturalratehypothesis.Theasymmetriclossfunctionandresultingoptimalmonetarypolicyexacerbatesshortfallsinactivity.Theadditionalfrequencyofactivityshortfallsarisesfromtheadjustmentofexpectationsimpliedbythenaturalratehypothesis.Theshortfallsasymmetryleadstoaninflationarybias,similartoresultsinthetime-consistencyliterature.Mandatingacentralbankobjectivewithgreatersymmetrythanthesociallossfunctionimprovesoutcomes.Greatersymmetrylowersthemagnitudeofactivityshortfalls.Greatersymmetryalsoreducesinflationbias.Themodelalsoimpliesthatanoptimalmonetarypolicydoesnotaccommodatefluctuationsfromaggregatedemandshocks,asisstandardinsuchmodels.Asaresult,theanalysisimpliesthatmonetaryaccommodationofstrengthineconomicactivitylikelyrequiresjustificationsotherthanasymmetriccostsofshortfalls.Keywords:MonetaryPolicy,Rules,discretion,symmetriclossfunction,asymmetriclossfunctionJELCodes:E52,E58,E37*Email:michael.t.kiley@frb.gov.TheviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflectthoseoftheFederalReserveBoardoritsstaff.IwouldliketothankparticipantsinaworkshoponrelatedworkattheFederalReserveBoardforcommentsandsuggestions.21.IntroductionIexaminetheconsequencesofmonetarypolicyapproachesresultingfromasymmetriesinthelossesassociatedwithemploymentshortfallsandstrength.Themodelassumesthenaturalratehypothesis—monetarypolicyisneutralinthelongrun.Theanalysisdemonstratesthatasymmetricmonetarypolicyapproacheshaveunintendedconsequences,includingexacerbatingactivityshortfallsandcreatinganinflationarybias.Mandatingthatcentralbanksbehave(relatively)symmetricallymitigatestheseunintendedconsequencesandimproveswelfare.Theanalysissuggeststhat,allelseequal,theasymmetryinthecostsoflabormarketweaknessandstrengthdoesnotwarrantmonetaryaccommodationofstronglabormarkets.Otherfactors,suchaspermanenteffectsofstronglabormarketsoneconomicpotential,maybenecessaryforoptimalmonetaryp
